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THE THEORY OF EVIDENCE.
The judgment of a court may be conceived of as being or
including the conclusion of a syllogism, of which the major premise
is a rule or proposition of law, and the minor premise a proposition
stating certain facts, which may be called the principal facts. Sir
J. F. Stephen in his book on Evidence calls these the "facts in
issue"; but that name is not so appropriate, because these facts are
not always disputed. They are facts from which the judgment
may be inferred without the aid of any other premises except
propositions of law, which are assumed to be known to the court.
EXAMPLE.
Major premise. A person who makes a contractand breaks it must pay
(Law.) damages.
Minor premise. A has made a certain contract(Principal facts.) with B and has broken it.
Conclusion.(Judgment.) A must pay damages.
Before the principal facts can be acted on by the court, i.e.,
used as premises for a judgment, they must be established. Facts,
whether the principal facts or others, can be established in the
following ways:
i. By judicial notice.
2. By an inference of law, i. e., an inference having a rule of
law as the major premise, from facts already established, as in
the case of a conclusive presumption of law.
3. By the solemn admission of the parties, either in the plead-
ings or made in court for the purpose of dispensing with proof. An
unsolemn admission is evidence only.
4. By the rules as to the burden of proof. This is a method
of last resort, only used when all others fail.
5. By proof. It is this only with which we are here concerned.
Proof of a fact, except in one case presently to be mentioned,
imports its inference from some other fact. The finding of a fact
by the jury or other trier of fact, such as a judge or referee, is
also the conclusion of a syllogism, of which a proposition stating
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some other fact is the minor premise. A fact from which another
fact is to be inferred may be called a probative fact. The major
premise of such a syllogism is either a rule of law, as in case of a
conclusive presumption of law, or some fact of common experience















The possessor of a thing is, sub-
ject to certain exceptions, deem-
ed the owner.
A was at a certain time in pos-
session of a certain thing and no
facts are shown to bring the
case under an exception.
A was the owner of the thing at
that time.
Men are likely to act according to
their desires and intentions.
A has been murdered. B desired
and intended to murder A.
B was (more or less probably)
the murderer.
There may be, and generally is, a series or chain of such in-
ferences from one probative fact to another, the conclusion of each
inference or syllogism standing as the minor premise, or, perhaps,
rarely, as the major, of the next. Sometimes the conclusions of
two or more earlier syllogisms are lumped together to form the
premise of the next, as in the last of the above examples, where the
minor premise consists of two facts, each of which must have been
separately proved. Then the lines of proof run together and blend
toward the top.
It is plain, however, that this series of inferences or of probative
facts, each depending on the preceding one, must have a starting
point somewhere. It must begin with some fact which is not
proved by inference from any previously established fact. This
may be called the primary fact. How is this proved? By direct
observation by the triers. Something is presented to them which
they directly perceive by their senses and which furnishes the basis
for all their inferences.
This brings us to the meaning of the word evidence. That
word has two meanings, the failure to distinguish between which
has led to much confusion. Evidence means:
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(1) Something directly presented to the senses of the triers,
on perceiving 1rhich they become aware of a fact.
(2) A probative fact.
The spoken words of a witness or a photograph produced in
evidence are of the first sort. On hearing or seeing these, thejury become directly aware of the fact that such words are spoken
in their presence or that certain outlines and shades exist on a
piece of paper. From these facts, by the aid of some su'ch general
propositions as that witnesses usually speak the truth or that photo-
graphs usually resemble their objects, as major premises, the jury
infer that some fact asserted by the witness exists or that a certain
object was of a certain nature.
Evidence of this first kind is of three classes, namely:
(i) Oral evidence; spoken words; presented to the triers'
sense of hearing;
(2) Written evidence; written words; presented to the triers'
sense of sight;
(3) Real evidence; other objects introduced as evidence, such
as photographs, models, etc,; presented to various senses of the
triers.
We use the word evidence in the second sense when we say
that hearsay is not evidence, i.e., the fact that a person not a party
to the proceeding or called as a witness has made one assertion out
of court is not permitted to be used as a probative fact from which
to infer the existence of a fact which he thus asserted.
In the investigations of common life and in scientific investi-
gations we have no arbitrary rules of evidence. We observe by our
senses any object or act of any sort which seems to us to disclose
any fact from which our inference can be logically drawn, and we
accept anr fact as a proper probative fact from which we think
that we can logically draw an inference. We act habitually on
hearsay evidence, and such evidence is- often extremely good
evidence.
There is no essential difference between judicial investigations
and others. But the peculiar conditions under which judicial in-
vestigations are carried on, particularly the fact that when such
an investigation has once been begun it must usually be carried
on without interruption to a finish, that neither party can usually
know before it begins exactly what evidence will be produced
against-him, and that the object of each party in producing evidence
is not usually -so much the elucidation of the truth on the estab-
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lishing of his case, as well as the danger of fraud, make it necessary
to have certain artificial rules. These are mainly rules of exclusion,
for barring out some kinds of evidence which we freely and rightly
use in other sorts of investigations. Experience has shown that
under the conditions of trials, especially before juries, certain kinds
of evidence, in the first sense of the word, and certain classes of
probative facts, if allowed to be presented, are likely to lead to
wrong conclusions or to open the door to fraud, and therefore
they are not admitted. The rule that the contents of a written
document must be proved, when possible, by the document itself,
relates to evidence in the first sense; the thing to be presented to
the senses of the triers must be the document, written evidence,
not spoken words, stating what the document contains, oral evi-
dence. The rule excluding hearsay, as above explained, relates to
probative facts; and so does the rule against opinions as evidence,
the fact that a certain person has a certain opinion not being usually
safe probative fact from which to infer that matters really are as he
believes them to be.
There are certain so-called rules of evidence or rules of law which
are usually stated in the form of rules of evidence, which really do
not fall under the theory of evidence at all. Such is the rule that
a written contract can not be varied by parol evidence-at least,
as it seems to me. That rule might be better expressed in some
such form as this: When a juristic act has been committed to
writing and the writing purports on its face to contain the entire
act, it is deemed to contain it all. The above is not intended, of
course, as a complete and accurate statement of the rule.
The rules excluding certain kinds of evidence are based on the
general principle of getting as close as possible to the original
sources of knowledge, which are what the law calls the best evidence.
Every time that a fact is transmitted from mind to mind there is a
fresh opportunity for inaccuracy or fraud in its giving, reception or
-retention in memory. Therefore the law says, let us have as few
transmissions as possible. No doubt in former times those rules
were too strict. But as they stand now they seem to me, and I
believe most lawyers will agree that experience justifies this view,
to be in the main founded in good sense and well adapted to the
conditions under which judicial investigations are carried on,
though perhaps they might still be relaxed a little with advantage.
Henry T. Terry.
